cfc758a9d012c3e4862bd169…
sampleTracked by C2 Tracker · indicators & metadata only, the APK itself is never published
Analyst notes
Tether, ReelShort lures). It serialises the live Accessibility tree to XML and queries Google Gemini to resolve on-screen targets and drive synthetic clicks - letting it read and operate banking and wallet apps on the victim’s behalf without a human operator. Heavily hardened against analysis: a ~61 MB AndroidManifest.xml padded with 0x9999-byte junk chunks, DEX poisoning (deliberately malformed bytecode that breaks naïve disassemblers), StringFog/StringCrypto string encryption and ZIP tampering. Configuration lives in a ZM26 container under assets/ - RatHat’s own encrypted-blob format: a 4-byte ZM26 magic, an 8-byte salt, then the payload XOR’d with a repeating 24-byte key (the per-sample xor_key from assets/zm26_meta.json, concatenated with that salt). The C2 is the serverUrl field of server_config.json - recoverable in plaintext in some builds, ZM26-encrypted in others. The primary FRP tunnel C2 is not a static indicator: it is fetched at runtime by the bundled Go agent liblocal-service.so, while libmedia_codec.so masquerades as the frpc tunnel client. Indicators: wss://an.likaiidc.cn.Recovered configuration
Source: plaintext:server_config.json
Identification
- SHA-256
- cfc758a9d012c3e4862bd169697b1e0db652c02274fb70a3f643ad26be208227
- MD5
- 942e0cf878a88186180cb7d48886e4fd
Observed
- Families
- RatHat
- First seen
- 2026-10-05
APK metadata
Summary
- Type
- Android · APK
- Package
- com.node.quick.pure
- Main activity
- com.node.quick.pure.A1
- Internal version
- 20007
- Displayed version
- 2.0.7
- Min SDK
- 24
- Target SDK
- 34
Signing certificate
- Valid from
- 2008-02-29 01:33:46
- Valid to
- 2035-07-17 01:33:46
- Serial
- 936eacbe07f201df
- Thumbprint
- 61ed377e85d386a8dfee6b864bd85b0bfaa5af81
- Subject
- C:US, CN:Android, L:Mountain View, O:Android, ST:California, OU:Android, email:[email protected]
- Subject email
- [email protected]
- Issuer
- C:US, CN:Android, L:Mountain View, O:Android, ST:California, OU:Android, email:[email protected]
Permissions (76)
Intent filters - actions
Intent filters - categories
C2 configuration (1)
Every indicator extracted from this sample. One row per C2 - each links to its indicator page with Whois, DNS and certificate pivots.
| Indicator | Type | Port | Scheme | Family | First seen |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| an.likaiidc.cn | domain | - | wss | RatHat | 2026-10-05 |
Signing certificate
- Subject CN
- Android
- Issuer CN
- Android
- Fingerprint
- a40da80a59d170caa950cf15c18c454d47a39b26989d8b640ecd745ba71bf5dc
Relationships
Sample → C2 indicators, signing certificate (with every other sample signed by it) and family. Click a node for details, double-click to open its page.
Click a node to inspect it.
About RatHat
AI-powered Android credential stealer / RAT (Zimperium, Sep 2026) posing as reward or finance apps (`Tether`, `ReelShort` lures). It serialises the live Accessibility tree to XML and queries Google **Gemini** to resolve on-screen targets and drive synthetic clicks - letting it read and operate banking and wallet apps on the victim's behalf without a human operator. Heavily hardened against analysis: a ~61 MB `AndroidManifest.xml` padded with `0x9999`-byte junk chunks, DEX poisoning (deliberately malformed bytecode that breaks naïve disassemblers), `StringFog`/`StringCrypto` string encryption and ZIP tampering. Configuration lives in a **ZM26 container** under `assets/` - RatHat's own encrypted-blob format: a 4-byte `ZM26` magic, an 8-byte salt, then the payload XOR'd with a repeating 24-byte key (the per-sample `xor_key` from `assets/zm26_meta.json`, concatenated with that salt). The C2 is the `serverUrl` field of `server_config.json` - recoverable in plaintext in some builds, `ZM26`-encrypted in others. The primary FRP tunnel C2 is not a static indicator: it is fetched at runtime by the bundled Go agent `liblocal-service.so`, while `libmedia_codec.so` masquerades as the `frpc` tunnel client.