cf6fab86b34eea3eabfdbe8a…
sampleTracked by C2 Tracker · indicators & metadata only, the APK itself is never published
Analyst notes
com.tool.move.good. Operator handle alei2005. buildTime 2026-05-29T16:45:55+08:00.
Config in assets/0.bt (ZM26 container). Decrypted config fields: serverUrl = http://207.56.28.183:8889, webUrl = https://cocoacider.cc/ - both stored ENC:-wrapped and recovered through the g21 double-XOR layer.
Neither endpoint is in Zimperium’s published RatHat IOCs (github.com/Zimperium/IOC → 2026-09-RatHat/c2.csv, checked 2026-10-05); the 207.56.28.183:8889 IP C2 is a direct-IP endpoint not seen in their set.Recovered configuration
Source: zm26-decrypted:0.bt
Identification
- SHA-256
- cf6fab86b34eea3eabfdbe8a8072f712cedbacf9b1faa123eef2c92b1d280afa
- MD5
- 209ca4c3447a70876219acc731417e95
Observed
- Families
- RatHat
- First seen
- 2026-09-09
APK metadata
Summary
- Type
- Android · APK
- Package
- com.tool.move.good
- Main activity
- com.tool.move.good.VisibleLauncherAlias
- Internal version
- 50807
- Displayed version
- 5.8.7
- Min SDK
- 24
- Target SDK
- 34
Signing certificate
- Valid from
- 2026-06-28 17:55:49
- Valid to
- 2053-11-13 17:55:49
- Serial
- 57789a1b5f1819f4
- Thumbprint
- 72cf5be5a334a17c3b0b6fe0c3258d38a3344675
- Subject
- C:US, CN:Debug, O:Debug
- Issuer
- C:US, CN:Debug, O:Debug
Permissions (45)
Intent filters - actions
Intent filters - categories
C2 configuration (2)
Every indicator extracted from this sample. One row per C2 - each links to its indicator page with Whois, DNS and certificate pivots.
| Indicator | Type | Port | Scheme | Family | First seen |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| cocoacider.cc/ | domain | - | https | RatHat | 2026-09-09 |
| 207.56.28.183 | ip | 8889 | http | RatHat | 2026-09-09 |
Signing certificate
- Subject CN
- Debug
- Issuer CN
- Debug
- Fingerprint
- 8a9e2e175d2ea4a41bf013985c26265b0934c5ab10f575d5377db2998a6ec170
Relationships
Sample → C2 indicators, signing certificate (with every other sample signed by it) and family. Click a node for details, double-click to open its page.
Click a node to inspect it.
About RatHat
AI-powered Android credential stealer / RAT (Zimperium, Sep 2026) posing as reward or finance apps (`Tether`, `ReelShort` lures). It serialises the live Accessibility tree to XML and queries Google **Gemini** to resolve on-screen targets and drive synthetic clicks - letting it read and operate banking and wallet apps on the victim's behalf without a human operator. Heavily hardened against analysis: a ~61 MB `AndroidManifest.xml` padded with `0x9999`-byte junk chunks, DEX poisoning (deliberately malformed bytecode that breaks naïve disassemblers), `StringFog`/`StringCrypto` string encryption and ZIP tampering. Configuration lives in a **ZM26 container** under `assets/` - RatHat's own encrypted-blob format: a 4-byte `ZM26` magic, an 8-byte salt, then the payload XOR'd with a repeating 24-byte key (the per-sample `xor_key` from `assets/zm26_meta.json`, concatenated with that salt). The C2 is the `serverUrl` field of `server_config.json` - recoverable in plaintext in some builds, `ZM26`-encrypted in others. The primary FRP tunnel C2 is not a static indicator: it is fetched at runtime by the bundled Go agent `liblocal-service.so`, while `libmedia_codec.so` masquerades as the `frpc` tunnel client.