9efccdb69b61a3de5b7dd2e4…

sample

Tracked by C2 Tracker · indicators & metadata only, the APK itself is never published

Analyst notes

RatHat. AI-powered Android credential stealer / RAT (Zimperium, Sep 2026) posing as reward or finance apps (Tether, ReelShort lures). It serialises the live Accessibility tree to XML and queries Google Gemini to resolve on-screen targets and drive synthetic clicks - letting it read and operate banking and wallet apps on the victim’s behalf without a human operator. Heavily hardened against analysis: a ~61 MB AndroidManifest.xml padded with 0x9999-byte junk chunks, DEX poisoning (deliberately malformed bytecode that breaks naïve disassemblers), StringFog/StringCrypto string encryption and ZIP tampering. Configuration lives in a ZM26 container under assets/ - RatHat’s own encrypted-blob format: a 4-byte ZM26 magic, an 8-byte salt, then the payload XOR’d with a repeating 24-byte key (the per-sample xor_key from assets/zm26_meta.json, concatenated with that salt). The C2 is the serverUrl field of server_config.json - recoverable in plaintext in some builds, ZM26-encrypted in others. The primary FRP tunnel C2 is not a static indicator: it is fetched at runtime by the bundled Go agent liblocal-service.so, while libmedia_codec.so masquerades as the frpc tunnel client. Indicators: admin.rathat.live.

Identification

SHA-256
9efccdb69b61a3de5b7dd2e4560657bf9fea46ca92caed54f6a24180f57a8850
MD5
8fdc21e25097a46528211274e54330e1

Observed

Families
RatHat
First seen
2026-02-04

APK metadata

Summary

Type
Android · APK
Package
guide.com.sensitiveusername.insexualawakening
Main activity
app.guide.wallet.android.activity.MainActivity
Internal version
1
Displayed version
1.0
Min SDK
24
Target SDK
34

Signing certificate

Valid from
2026-02-02 14:50:13
Valid to
2108-03-24 14:50:13
Serial
41c70aec
Thumbprint
0fb5233e66716c93fc1beeaca12d3295c3abff77
Subject
C:CN, CN:guide.com.sensitiveusername.insexualawakening, L:HongKong, O:guide.com.sensitiveusername.insexualawakening, ST:HongKong, OU:guide.com.sensitiveusername.insexualawakening
Issuer
C:CN, CN:guide.com.sensitiveusername.insexualawakening, L:HongKong, O:guide.com.sensitiveusername.insexualawakening, ST:HongKong, OU:guide.com.sensitiveusername.insexualawakening

Permissions (4)

android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATEandroid.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATEandroid.permission.INTERNETandroid.permission.REQUEST_INSTALL_PACKAGES

Activities (1)

  • app.guide.wallet.android.activity.MainActivity

Services (1)

  • app.guide.wallet.android.service.LocalVPNService

Providers (1)

  • android.support.v4.content.FileProvider

Intent filters - actions

android.net.VpnService

C2 configuration (1)

Every indicator extracted from this sample. One row per C2 - each links to its indicator page with Whois, DNS and certificate pivots.

IndicatorTypePortSchemeFamilyFirst seen
admin.rathat.live domain - - RatHat 2026-02-04

Signing certificate

Subject CN
guide.com.sensitiveusername.insexualawakening
Issuer CN
guide.com.sensitiveusername.insexualawakening
Fingerprint
8a3b866490248a5137f709ef5aac2785d72a847269a65bb622be597094e589d2

Relationships

Sample → C2 indicators, signing certificate (with every other sample signed by it) and family. Click a node for details, double-click to open its page.

Click a node to inspect it.

About RatHat

AI-powered Android credential stealer / RAT (Zimperium, Sep 2026) posing as reward or finance apps (`Tether`, `ReelShort` lures). It serialises the live Accessibility tree to XML and queries Google **Gemini** to resolve on-screen targets and drive synthetic clicks - letting it read and operate banking and wallet apps on the victim's behalf without a human operator. Heavily hardened against analysis: a ~61 MB `AndroidManifest.xml` padded with `0x9999`-byte junk chunks, DEX poisoning (deliberately malformed bytecode that breaks naïve disassemblers), `StringFog`/`StringCrypto` string encryption and ZIP tampering. Configuration lives in a **ZM26 container** under `assets/` - RatHat's own encrypted-blob format: a 4-byte `ZM26` magic, an 8-byte salt, then the payload XOR'd with a repeating 24-byte key (the per-sample `xor_key` from `assets/zm26_meta.json`, concatenated with that salt). The C2 is the `serverUrl` field of `server_config.json` - recoverable in plaintext in some builds, `ZM26`-encrypted in others. The primary FRP tunnel C2 is not a static indicator: it is fetched at runtime by the bundled Go agent `liblocal-service.so`, while `libmedia_codec.so` masquerades as the `frpc` tunnel client.