7261b1f4f4b904405136fb4a…
sampleTracked by C2 Tracker · indicators & metadata only, the APK itself is never published
Analyst notes
wss://admin.fjbjwgyuyftg.qpon/ (plaintext server_config.json). buildTime 2026-06-22T19:04:11+08:00.
Same Gemini API key and buildTime as 35b19577… - same operator/build batch.Identification
- SHA-256
- 7261b1f4f4b904405136fb4a1a0267ade1952e397b57a49b05efa6a92d32cd30
- MD5
- 5d51de326a3b3415685b9230992ce183
Observed
- Families
- RatHat
- First seen
- 2026-09-07
APK metadata
Summary
- Type
- Android · APK
- Package
- -
- Main activity
- -
- Internal version
- -
- Displayed version
- -
- Min SDK
- -
- Target SDK
- -
Signing certificate
- Valid from
- 2008-02-29 01:33:46
- Valid to
- 2035-07-17 01:33:46
- Serial
- 936eacbe07f201df
- Thumbprint
- 61ed377e85d386a8dfee6b864bd85b0bfaa5af81
- Subject
- C:US, CN:Android, L:Mountain View, O:Android, ST:California, OU:Android, email:[email protected]
- Subject email
- [email protected]
- Issuer
- C:US, CN:Android, L:Mountain View, O:Android, ST:California, OU:Android, email:[email protected]
Permissions (79)
Intent filters - actions
Intent filters - categories
C2 configuration (1)
Every indicator extracted from this sample. One row per C2 - each links to its indicator page with Whois, DNS and certificate pivots.
| Indicator | Type | Port | Scheme | Family | First seen |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| admin.fjbjwgyuyftg.qpon/ | domain | - | wss | RatHat | 2026-09-07 |
Signing certificate
- Subject CN
- Android
- Issuer CN
- Android
- Fingerprint
- a40da80a59d170caa950cf15c18c454d47a39b26989d8b640ecd745ba71bf5dc
Relationships
Sample → C2 indicators, signing certificate (with every other sample signed by it) and family. Click a node for details, double-click to open its page.
Click a node to inspect it.
About RatHat
AI-powered Android credential stealer / RAT (Zimperium, Sep 2026) posing as reward or finance apps (`Tether`, `ReelShort` lures). It serialises the live Accessibility tree to XML and queries Google **Gemini** to resolve on-screen targets and drive synthetic clicks - letting it read and operate banking and wallet apps on the victim's behalf without a human operator. Heavily hardened against analysis: a ~61 MB `AndroidManifest.xml` padded with `0x9999`-byte junk chunks, DEX poisoning (deliberately malformed bytecode that breaks naïve disassemblers), `StringFog`/`StringCrypto` string encryption and ZIP tampering. Configuration lives in a **ZM26 container** under `assets/` - RatHat's own encrypted-blob format: a 4-byte `ZM26` magic, an 8-byte salt, then the payload XOR'd with a repeating 24-byte key (the per-sample `xor_key` from `assets/zm26_meta.json`, concatenated with that salt). The C2 is the `serverUrl` field of `server_config.json` - recoverable in plaintext in some builds, `ZM26`-encrypted in others. The primary FRP tunnel C2 is not a static indicator: it is fetched at runtime by the bundled Go agent `liblocal-service.so`, while `libmedia_codec.so` masquerades as the `frpc` tunnel client.