309523ecd0c4bc5e337005e7…

sample

Tracked by C2 Tracker · indicators & metadata only, the APK itself is never published

Analyst notes

ZooPark. ZooPark is a long-running Android surveillance operation first exposed by Kaspersky in 2018, aimed at targets across the Middle East (Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Morocco, Jordan). It spreads through compromised or official-looking news and political sites and Telegram channels, masquerading as government, electoral or messaging utilities (the observed entekhab10.xp3.biz lure echoes the Iranian Entekhab news brand). Capabilities grew across four generations from simple SMS/call-log theft to full spyware: exfiltration of contacts, SMS, call logs, GPS location, keylogs, camera photos and the Telegram/WhatsApp/browser databases. Stolen data is uploaded to operator dead-drop C2 web servers (androidupdaters.com, www.rhubarb2.com, www.rhubarb3.com). APT / state-aligned. Indicators: http://www.rhubarb3.com/.

Identification

SHA-256
309523ecd0c4bc5e337005e71666da3711d0cda519100d5d5aa019b22dc61cbd
MD5
b44b91b14f176fbf93d998141931a4aa

Observed

Families
ZooPark
First seen
2018-05-08

APK metadata

Summary

Type
Android · APK
Package
com.del.tele.acc
Main activity
com.del.tele.acc.main
Internal version
5
Displayed version
5
Min SDK
5
Target SDK
14

Signing certificate

Valid from
2017-05-25 05:56:55
Valid to
2044-10-10 05:56:55
Serial
25208471
Thumbprint
e1326479b5ece0495aa57c92d20366ee08073937
Subject
C:e, CN:t, L:m, O:m, ST:f, OU:e
Issuer
C:e, CN:t, L:m, O:m, ST:f, OU:e

Permissions (23)

android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATIONandroid.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATEandroid.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATEandroid.permission.BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICEandroid.permission.CALL_PHONEandroid.permission.CAMERAandroid.permission.GET_ACCOUNTSandroid.permission.INTERNETandroid.permission.PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLSandroid.permission.READ_CALL_LOGandroid.permission.READ_CONTACTSandroid.permission.READ_PHONE_STATEandroid.permission.READ_SMSandroid.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETEDandroid.permission.RECEIVE_SMSandroid.permission.RECORD_AUDIOandroid.permission.SEND_SMSandroid.permission.STORAGEandroid.permission.SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOWandroid.permission.WRITE_CALL_LOGandroid.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGEandroid.permission.WRITE_SMScom.android.browser.permission.READ_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS

Activities (1)

  • com.del.tele.acc.main

Services (5)

  • anywheresoftware.b4a.samples.httputils2.httputils2service
  • com.del.update.MainService
  • com.testunit.android.AS
  • com.testunit.android.GooglePlayService
  • com.testunit.android.l.CRS

Receivers (4)

  • anywheresoftware.b4a.samples.httputils2.httputils2service$httputils2service_BR
  • com.del.update.BootReceiver
  • com.testunit.android.r.DSR
  • com.testunit.android.r.W

Intent filters - actions

android.accessibilityservice.AccessibilityServiceandroid.intent.action.ACTION_POWER_CONNECTEDandroid.intent.action.BOOT_COMPLETEDandroid.intent.action.DATA_SMS_RECEIVED

Intent filters - categories

android.intent.category.DEFAULT

C2 configuration (1)

Every indicator extracted from this sample. One row per C2 - each links to its indicator page with Whois, DNS and certificate pivots.

IndicatorTypePortSchemeFamilyFirst seen
www.rhubarb3.com/ domain - http ZooPark 2018-05-08

Signing certificate

Subject CN
t
Issuer CN
t
Fingerprint
5635068bf7eda25aab043748243c75b5cedbabced9b510822220d380a27f3fd8

Relationships

Sample → C2 indicators, signing certificate (with every other sample signed by it) and family. Click a node for details, double-click to open its page.

Click a node to inspect it.

About ZooPark

**ZooPark** is a long-running Android surveillance operation first exposed by Kaspersky in 2018, aimed at targets across the **Middle East** (Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Morocco, Jordan). It spreads through compromised or official-looking news and political sites and Telegram channels, masquerading as government, electoral or messaging utilities (the observed entekhab10.xp3.biz lure echoes the Iranian Entekhab news brand). Capabilities grew across four generations from simple SMS/call-log theft to full spyware: exfiltration of contacts, SMS, call logs, GPS location, keylogs, camera photos and the Telegram/WhatsApp/browser databases. Stolen data is uploaded to operator dead-drop C2 web servers (androidupdaters.com, www.rhubarb2.com, www.rhubarb3.com). APT / state-aligned.