zq.hao18.top/0wh/

domain C2 resolving

Tracked by C2 Tracker · Updated as of 2026-10-11 · Whois queried 2026-10-05T10:38:02

Registration

Registrar
-
Registered
-
Expires
-

DNS

Resolves to
104.21.33.28, 172.67.140.187
Nameservers
-
Status
-

Observed in malware

FamilySample SHA-256RoleFirst seen
RatHat f179f0a98187… C2 2026-06-01

About RatHat

AI-powered Android credential stealer / RAT (Zimperium, Sep 2026) posing as reward or finance apps (`Tether`, `ReelShort` lures). It serialises the live Accessibility tree to XML and queries Google **Gemini** to resolve on-screen targets and drive synthetic clicks - letting it read and operate banking and wallet apps on the victim's behalf without a human operator. Heavily hardened against analysis: a ~61 MB `AndroidManifest.xml` padded with `0x9999`-byte junk chunks, DEX poisoning (deliberately malformed bytecode that breaks naïve disassemblers), `StringFog`/`StringCrypto` string encryption and ZIP tampering. Configuration lives in a **ZM26 container** under `assets/` - RatHat's own encrypted-blob format: a 4-byte `ZM26` magic, an 8-byte salt, then the payload XOR'd with a repeating 24-byte key (the per-sample `xor_key` from `assets/zm26_meta.json`, concatenated with that salt). The C2 is the `serverUrl` field of `server_config.json` - recoverable in plaintext in some builds, `ZM26`-encrypted in others. The primary FRP tunnel C2 is not a static indicator: it is fetched at runtime by the bundled Go agent `liblocal-service.so`, while `libmedia_codec.so` masquerades as the `frpc` tunnel client.

Signing certificate

Subject CN
Mobile Development Team
Issuer CN
Mobile Development Team
Valid
2023-11-01 → 2054-01-05
Fingerprint
7c62fcb862fb296297074dd4ca550e3a87ce224c5b1ed62fed7ad6f66ac1e2be

Other samples signed with this certificate? That's a lead worth checking - but not proof of a shared operator, since signing keys (and the Android debug certificate in particular) are widely reused. See the certificate page for every sample signed with it.